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Executive Secretary

16 Nov '88

Date

3637 (10-81)

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No. NSDD 319

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WASHINGTON

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~~Executive Order~~
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November 14, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: United States Policy Towards Indochina (U)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on United States Policy Towards Indochina for implementation. (S)


Colin L. Powell

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 319

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS INDOCHINA (U)

BACKGROUND

Vietnamese public pledges to withdraw from Cambodia; increased recognition by the Peoples Republic of China that measures need to be taken to ensure that the Khmer Rouge do not return to power in Cambodia; the increased dialogue and negotiations in the region and internationally concerning Cambodia; and accelerated progress on United States bilateral humanitarian issues with Vietnam provide increased opportunities for the United States to exercise its influence to achieve an acceptable political settlement in Cambodia and contribute to long-term stability in Southeast Asia. (S)

Due to these conditions, a more active United States posture to influence events is now warranted. Therefore, based on the national security study on policy towards Indochina dated October 27, 1988, which was tasked through NSSD 1-88, I approve of the actions below in order to maintain the pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its forces, increase our support for a democratic alternative in Cambodia, and tailor our positive gestures towards Vietnam based upon progress towards a Cambodian settlement and/or progress on POW/MIAs and other humanitarian issues. (S)

APPROVED RECOMMENDATIONS

- Intensify our consultations with ASEAN on the Cambodian conflict and establish a more regular framework for collective discussions. (C)
- Continue our economic isolation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) while discouraging others from increased trade with Vietnam. Coordinate with ASEAN to carry the same message to countries seeking increased economic contacts with Vietnam, such as Japan, South Korea and France. (S)
- Work with ASEAN to refine our position on Vietnam's participation in negotiations aimed at achieving an acceptable Cambodian settlement and a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and to put the burden more clearly on Vietnam for the lack of movement toward a settlement. (S)

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- Increase our public support for Prince Sihanouk and his diplomatic efforts. (C)
- Seek every opportunity forcefully and publicly to reaffirm our abhorrence of the Khmer Rouge and our opposition to its return to power. (C)
- Oppose any return of the Pol Pot leadership group while accepting that elements of the Khmer Rouge forces may have to be a part of a Cambodian settlement. Our focus should be to formulate and implement effective measures to prevent their return to power or their attempts to intimidate the Cambodian people. (S)
- Intensify our discussions with ASEAN and the Chinese concerning measures which need to be implemented as part of a settlement to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. (S)
- Continue to emphasize publicly that we are prepared to consider normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam in the context of a Cambodian settlement. If warranted by future developments, we should raise with ASEAN the advisability of our discussing directly with the Vietnamese our position on normalization and its positive implications for them. We should remain open to discussions with Hanoi if desired by ASEAN or warranted by progress toward a Cambodian settlement. (S)
- At an appropriate time, we should consider a limited broadening of exceptions to the 25-mile travel limit for the SRV Mission to the United Nations. (C)
- When warranted by progress in our humanitarian dialogue with Vietnam, we should permit SRV officials directly responsible for humanitarian cooperation with the United States to visit Washington for discussions of clearly-defined humanitarian issues. (C)
- In response to sound, concrete Vietnamese cooperation on prisoner of war/missing in action and/or other United States Government humanitarian interests, we should reiterate our proposal to establish a technical office in Vietnam to handle POW/MIA, former reeducation camp detainees and refugee issues. (S)
- Publicly and more widely support efforts by the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to assist the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), especially those which reflect our main concerns -- programs under the auspices of the UN's High Commissioner for Refugees and Fund for Drug Abuse Control, and humanitarian projects tied to crash site excavations. (C)

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- Encourage increased bilateral assistance by third countries to Laos. (C)
- Offer small but visible contributions to UN agencies, such as UNFDAC and UNHCR, as well as NGOs involved in assistance to Laos. (C)
- Seek congressional support for a small bilateral assistance program in Laos. (C)
- Continue to work through the International Committee of the Red Cross and others as appropriate to effect the return of remains of Americans from Cambodia while avoiding direct negotiations that would allow politicization of the POW/MIA issue in the region. (C)
- Discuss with ASEAN the adequacy of the assistance, in type and quality, provided to the Khmer noncommunist resistance in the context of our efforts to strengthen its political viability. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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Executive Secretary

16 Nov '88

Date

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Executive Secretary

25 May '88

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Executive Registry

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May 23, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: United States Policy Towards Indochina (S)

Attached are the approved terms of reference for a review of
United States Policy Towards Indochina. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Colin L. Powell
Colin L. Powell

Attachment

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May 23, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY
DIRECTIVE NO. 1-88

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS INDOCHINA (S)

Introduction

This National Security Study Directive (NSSD) establishes the terms of reference for an interagency review of United States policy towards Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). A review is warranted in light of recent developments that could potentially affect United States interests in the region. (S)

Scope

The review should cover all three Indochinese states, with particular focus on the Cambodian conflict. (S)

The review should discuss existing policies towards Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, examine the implications of recent developments for our policy objectives, and, if necessary, recommend policy adjustments. (S)

The Cambodian Conflict

Assess the situation on the ground in Cambodia, including Vietnamese military options and the relative strength and prospects of the various Cambodian factions. (S)

Assess recent diplomatic developments, e.g., Prince Sihanouk's activities, including his meetings with Phnom Penh Prime Minister Hun Sen, and the efforts of Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas to organize a Jakarta "cocktail party." (S)

Review the positions of the governments with significant influence and interests in the Cambodian conflict, including:

- Vietnam: Vietnamese objectives and intentions in Cambodia. Possibility of diplomatic flexibility and prospect of entering serious negotiations. Prospects for withdrawal by 1990.

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- China: Prospects for PRC willingness/ability to control Khmer Rouge as part of settlement. Chinese strategic objectives in event of settlement (and in its absence). Likelihood of Chinese support for settlement leading to diminished role for Khmer Rouge and leadership by Prince Sihanouk.
- Thailand/ASEAN: Prospects for continued unified ASEAN support for opposition to Vietnamese occupation. Implications for ASEAN cohesion of a) continued Vietnamese intransigence or b) rapid movement toward settlement. Thailand's likely stance towards the Khmer Rouge in a settlement. Implications of ASEAN trade with Vietnam for U.S./ASEAN strategy (and possible United States isolation on this issue).
- The Soviet Union: Possibility of its playing constructive role in urging Hanoi to negotiate/withdraw, and in guaranteeing a settlement. Utility of Afghan agreement as a model for Cambodia. (S)

Current United States policy towards the Cambodian conflict emphasizes: support for ASEAN and Prince Sihanouk, support for the diplomatic/economic isolation of Vietnam, support for the Cambodian non-communist resistance, and opposition to the return of the Khmer Rouge. Examine whether/how our policy focus should change in order to hasten an acceptable outcome, including whether we should, for example:

- Attempt to further strengthen coordination with ASEAN, e.g., to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Hanoi (and put the burden more clearly on Vietnam for lack of movement toward settlement).
- Review with ASEAN governments whether we should also seek to develop positive incentives to encourage Vietnamese flexibility.
- Increase our public support for and coordination with Prince Sihanouk.
- Increase the levels or change the mix of our aid to the non-communist resistance to prepare it for competition with the Khmer Rouge and/or counter the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea/Peoples Army of Vietnam (PRK/PAVN).
- Examine the need for better defined United States position on what (any) Khmer Rouge involvement in the negotiations and post-settlement period is acceptable.

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
- Explore the utility of developing with ASEAN and China a framework to control the Khmer Rouge and consider how such a framework could be used to increase the pressure on Vietnam to negotiate.
- Examine the possibility and utility of more active/detailed dialogue with Soviets on Cambodia. Consider how to limit gains that might accrue to Soviets from their more active involvement.
- Explore whether/how to raise Cambodia directly with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Can our willingness to normalize in the context of a settlement be used to encourage the Vietnamese to compromise? Are there other inducements, short of normalization, we could employ to encourage further movement? Would any dialogue with Hanoi on these issues vitiate our overall strategy/leverage? What would the effect be on Soviet attitudes towards Hanoi?
- Consider whether increased U.S./Lao cooperation would affect the Cambodian equation. (S)

Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos: Humanitarian Issues

Review the current status of our efforts to achieve POW/MIA accounting and other humanitarian objectives (political prisoners, Amerasians, Orderly Departure Program (ODP)), and address, inter alia:

- Vietnam: What additional incentives or cooperative arrangements can be developed to maximize Vietnamese responses on humanitarian issues without undermining our Cambodian policy?
- Laos: How can we improve Lao cooperation on humanitarian issues and what measures can be used to decrease their involvement in the narcotics trade?
- Cambodia: How can we bring pressure to bear on Cambodia to return through international/humanitarian channels the remains of Americans that they claim to hold? (S)

The study shall be conducted on a strict need-to-know basis by an interagency group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. It should be completed by June 13, 1988. (C)


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